Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma by Ichinose, Genki et al.
Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and
Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma
Genki Ichinose1*, Masaya Saito1, Shinsuke Suzuki2,3,4
1 Systems and Control Engineering, Anan National College of Technology, Anan, Tokushima, Japan, 2 JSPS fellow, Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University,
Sapporo, Hokkaido, Japan, 3 Laboratory for Integrated Theoretical Neuroscience, Riken Brain Science Institute, Wako, Saitama, Japan, 4Division of Humanities and Social
Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, United States of America
Abstract
Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Recent studies have
investigated the effect of migration for the evolution of cooperation. However, little is known about whether and how an
individuals’ cooperativeness coevolves with mobility. One possibility is that mobility enhances cooperation by enabling
cooperators to escape from defectors and form clusters; the other possibility is that mobility inhibits cooperation by helping
the defectors to catch and exploit the groups of cooperators. In this study we investigate the coevolutionary dynamics by
using the prisoner’s dilemma game model on a lattice structure. The computer simulations demonstrate that natural
selection maintains cooperation in the form of evolutionary chasing between the cooperators and defectors. First,
cooperative groups grow and collectively move in the same direction. Then, mutant defectors emerge and invade the
cooperative groups, after which the defectors exploit the cooperators. Then other cooperative groups emerge due to
mutation and the cycle is repeated. Here, it is worth noting that, as a result of natural selection, the mobility evolves towards
directional migration, but not to random or completely fixed migration. Furthermore, with directional migration, the rate of
global population extinction is lower when compared with other cases without the evolution of mobility (i.e., when mobility
is preset to random or fixed). These findings illustrate the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and mobility through the
directional chasing between cooperators and defectors.
Citation: Ichinose G, Saito M, Suzuki S (2013) Collective Chasing Behavior between Cooperators and Defectors in the Spatial Prisoner’s Dilemma. PLoS ONE 8(7):
e67702. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702
Editor: Petter Holme, Umea˚ University, Sweden
Received December 8, 2012; Accepted May 23, 2013; Published July 5, 2013
Copyright:  2013 Ichinose et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows Number 232648. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and
analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: igenki@gmail.com
Introduction
Cooperation is one of the essential factors for all biological
organisms in major evolutionary transitions. Cooperation to help
others incurs some cost to the actor, and natural selection therefore
favors a more selfish behavior unless a specific mechanism is
introduced. Several mechanisms have been proposed for the
evolution of cooperation [1]: kin selection [2], direct reciprocity
[3], indirect reciprocity [4], network reciprocity [5], and multilevel
(group) selection [6]. For each mechanism, the inherent principle is
different; however, one very common feature is that cooperators
tend to interact more with themselves than with defectors. This
significantly contributes to the evolution of cooperation.
Given that biological interactions in the real world are often
local rather than global, researchers have investigated the
evolution of cooperation on networks such as square lattices
[7,8], small-world [9,10] or scale-free networks [5,11,12]: individ-
uals in a population occupy the nodes of the network, and the links
define who interacts with whom. Since the seminal work by
Nowak and May [7], numerous studies have demonstrated that
the network structures facilitate the evolution of cooperation by
allowing cooperators to form clusters with each other; this is
termed as network reciprocity [1].
For example, Santos and Pacheco [5] have shown that a scale-
free network structure, in which the number of links for each
individual is highly heterogeneous, can facilitate network reci-
procity (but see Masuda [13]). Moreover, Wang et al. [14,15] have
investigated the effect of network density by employing a square
lattice with empty sites. They have found that there is an optimal
density for the evolution of network reciprocity in the sparse
environments. Furthermore, recent studies have specified various
factors such the heterogeneity in the way of adopting the fittest
strategy [16,17], age structure [18], teaching activity [19],
inferring reputation of individuals [20], and the diversity in the
mapping of game payoffs to individual fitness [21] that promote
cooperation on a network. Taken together, it has been shown that
local interactions of individuals make it possible for cooperators to
form clusters with each other and then enable the evolution of
cooperation, which is facilitated by various types of heterogeneity.
However, it is unknown how cooperators form clusters with other
distant cooperators. In other words, we desire to know if they are
able to escape from defectors while maintaining the cluster.
The migration of individuals is one of the effective mechanisms
for cooperators to generate such assortative interactions with
themselves rather than with defectors. Interest in the effect of
migration has gradually increased, as shown in recent studies [22–
43]. Some studies have assumed that migration occurs randomly,
which is known as ‘‘non-contingent’’ migration [22,24,28–
31,36,42]. The effect of such random migration on cooperation
has been intensively explored by Vainstein et al. [31]. They have
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assumed that each individual moves to a randomly chosen site in a
random timing within its four nearest neighbors in a square lattice
environment. It has been found that cooperation is promoted at
the intermediate mobilities and densities compared with the no
migration case. This model has also been extended to various
games (such as snowdrift and stag hunt) on a spatial structure [36].
Animals often migrate to other places conditionally, and not
randomly. For instance, Jiang et al. [41] have introduced adaptive
migration in spatial games. In their model, an individual moves to
an empty site with a nD=4 probability, where nD is the number of
defectors in the four adjacent neighbors. They have shown that
this type of migration promotes cooperation, especially in the
intermediate density. In the model by Yang et al. [40], aspiration-
induced migration has been assumed, in which an individual
moves to a randomly chosen empty site within its four neighbors if
the payoff for the individual falls below his aspiration level. The
optimal level of cooperation has been found when both the
aspiration level and the density are in the medium range.
Moreover, Helbing et al. [35,37] have shown that in addition to
the timing of migration, cooperation is facilitated if individuals can
move to their preferred destination. Despite the significant effect of
contingent movement on the evolution of cooperation, one caveat
to these studies is that a heightened awareness of the environment
is often required for this type of movement. For more basic
biological organisms such as cells, it is hard to detect whether their
current location is good or bad. Furthermore, they cannot know
for sure if the destination to which they are moving is good or bad.
For such organisms, a more primitive rule for the movement is
plausible.
Here, it is worth noting that most of these studies on the effect of
migration have treated migration as an exogenous non-evolvable
trait (but see [27,28,42]). However, in the real world, the rate and
directionality of the migration must evolve under natural selection.
In other words, the following issues cannot be addressed in the
previous studies. Imagine that in an ecosystem, some individuals
migrate to the right very quickly, others migrate slowly to the left,
and the remainder never migrate. Which types spread over the
population as a result of natural selection? How does the evolution
of migration interact with the evolution of cooperation?
In this study, we investigate the coevolution of migration and
cooperation. To address this issue, we have constructed a spatial
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game model in which each individual’s
cooperativeness, and the migration rate, and direction can be
either enhanced or suppressed by natural selection. Notably, our
model differs from those incorporating contingent migration in
that the individuals’ high intelligence is not postulated. For
example, the timing of migration depends solely on the inherent
rate, but not on the environmental situations (e.g., the neighbors’
cooperativeness, etc.) and each individual does not necessarily
know beforehand whether or not the destination of the migration
is favorable. In this sense, we believe that the present model is
applicable to the coevolution of cooperation and mobility in a wide
range of organisms in the real world.
Spatial PD Model with Directional Evolution
We consider a model in which N initial individuals play PD,
reproduce, die, and migrate, all in a two-dimensional square
lattice. The direction of migration is determined in accordance
with a probability vector d[f(dU ,dD,dL,dR); di§0,
X
di~1g in
which each element indicates the weight of the movement to an
upper space (dU ), a down space (dD), a left space (dL), and a right
space (dR). The PD strategy, migration rate, and this probability
vector evolve under natural selection (see details in Table 1). The
flow of the simulation is described in Fig. 1, and Models presents
a detailed setting. The evolutionary simulations identify interesting
phenomena: cooperators collectively move in a particular direc-
tion; next, defectors chase the cooperators, and after which the
defectors catch up with the cooperators, and the local population
almost becomes extinct; other cooperative clusters emerge from
defectors due to mutation. After returning to the initial state,
similar cycles are then repeated. We find that the oscillatory
cooperation and defection dynamics are balanced as a result of this
chasing behavior, which results in population stability.
Results
Evolutionary simulations of the model show the coevolutionary
dynamics of ‘‘cooperativeness’’ and ‘‘mobility toward a particular
direction (directional migration),’’ which we call evolutionary
Table 1. Parameters in basic settings.
Each individual’s strategy
(evolved by natural selection)
Cooperativeness C or D
Migration rate pm[½0,1
Direction of the migration d[f(dU ,dD,dL,dR); di§0,
X
di~1g
Environment
Size of the lattice M~30
Initial population size N~1000
Benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation b=c~3:5
Probability of death pd~0:4
Mutation rate of strategy m~0:001
Variance of the mutation in pm and d s2~0:01
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.t001
Figure 1. Spatial PD model in a two-dimensional square lattice
with directional evolution. Blue (Red) represents a cooperator
(defector). The simulation flow is as follows: 1) Each individual plays PD
with others within the same site. 2) Each individual reproduces one
offspring with a certain probability (see Models). 3) Each individual
dies with a probability pd . 4) Each individual migrates to one of four
neighbors with a probability depending on d . These four steps are then
repeated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g001
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chasing between cooperators and defectors. A typical dynamics is
as follows (see Fig. 2(a)). At the initial generation, clusters of
cooperators emerge in several spaces by chance. Meanwhile, some
of the cooperative clusters remaining in the same locations are
exploited by defectors. In contrast, the other clusters can flourish
by moving in a specific direction. However, the success of
cooperators does not last long because mutated defectors move in
the same direction with cooperators and invade them. The local
populations are therefore almost extinct, but new cooperators
suddenly emerge again possibly due to mutation (examined later).
These cycles spontaneously arise in various times and spaces.
Figure 2(a) shows snapshots of a typical evolutionary dynamics
(see also Video S1 for the first supporting information video). In
this example run, the evolution of migration is almost vertical. In
the 931st generation, a cooperative cluster is generated (labeled
‘‘1’’), which then spreads to a lower space because they are
mutually beneficial to each other (954th). The cooperators
continue to move in the same direction, while some defectors
emerge in the center of the cluster (976th). In the 997th
generation, the defectors move in the same direction as the
cooperators and invade them, as a result of which the cooperators
are almost all exploited (997th). In the same generation, another
cooperative cluster is generated at the top space (labeled ‘‘2’’).
They move in a downward direction (1019th and 1040th) but are
exploited by defectors in the 1062nd generation. As a result, the
#2 population collapses (1086th). The #3 population then repeats
the same cycle. In this run, such vertical movements of the
individuals are frequently observed (see Fig. S1 in File S1).
In another simulation run, we find the evolution of a different
direction in which the horizontal migrations of the individuals are
observed (Fig. 3(a)). Video S2 shows a series of this evolution.
Oscillatory dynamics are also observed during this cycle; however,
in this case, evolution results in a directional migration to the right.
In the 361st generation, two different cooperative groups (labeled
‘‘1’’ and ‘‘2’’) emerge and move to the right while increasing their
peers (384th, 406th, and 427th). In the 445th generation, the #1
cooperative group is invaded by defectors, while a new group
emerge (labeled ‘‘3’’). Eventually, the #2 and #3 groups are
exploited by the defectors (465th and 483rd, respectively). We
observe chasing behaviors common throughout the simulation
runs, although the direction is different for each evolutionary
dynamics.
Comparison with Two Extreme Cases
We next try to understand the nature of the chasing behavior by
comparing our results with the two extreme cases: random and
fixed migration. In the random migration model, all the
individuals move in a random direction, that is, their probability
vectors are fixed at d~fdU ,dD,dL,dRg~f0:25,0:25,0:25,0:25g
for all individuals through a simulation (Fig. 4(a)). On the other
hand, in the fixed migration model, all the individuals move in the
same direction (an upward direction), i.e., the probability vector is
fixed at d~fdU ,dD,dL,dRg~f1,0,0,0g for all individuals through-
out the simulation (Fig. 5(a)).
First, we quantitatively show that in our model, natural selection
favors directional migration, and not random or fixed migration.
The directionality of the migration is represented by the degree to
which elements in the probability vector, d, are biased. This can
be measured by entropy (Hd~{
P
dilog2di). In our main model,
by natural selection, the average value of the entropy over
individuals results in between zero and two regardless of the benefit
to cost ratio of cooperation (see green lines in Fig. 2(b) and 3(b) for
the typical dynamics shown in the previous section; Fig. 6 shows
the averaged values over 1000 runs of the simulation as a function
of the benefit to cost ratio of cooperation). Given that the value of
entropy is by definition two in random migration and zero in fixed
migration, these results indicate that natural selection leads
individuals to move in a particular, but not completely the same,
direction accompanied by the chasing between cooperators and
defectors.
Second, we demonstrate the difference in the frequency of
extinction between our original model and random/fixed migra-
tion models. In the fixed migration model, evolutionary dynamics
results in the rapid extinction (see Fig. 5(b) for a typical example).
Sensitivity analyses based on the average extinction rate of over
1000 simulation runs show that this statement holds true
irrespective of the benefit to cost ratio of cooperation (see Fig. 7),
initial density of the individuals (N=(M|M); see Fig. 8(a)),
variance of the mutation (s2; see Fig. 8(b)), or rate of the mutation
(m; see Fig. 8(c)). This indicates that flexibility in the direction of
migration is essential to sustain cooperation.
In the random migration model, evolutionary dynamics initially
appears to be similar to that in the original model, that is, the
oscillation of the frequency of cooperators and defectors (see
Fig. 4(b) and Fig. 2(b)). However, an examination of the average
extinction rate over 1000 simulation runs reveals that the rate is
greater in the random migration model compared with that in our
original model. We further confirm that this difference is observed
in a wide range of parameter settings such as the benefit to cost
ratio of cooperation, initial density of the individuals, rate of the
mutation or variance of the mutation (see Figs. 7 and 8). Taken
together, these extinction rate results suggest that a moderate level
of flexibility in the direction of migration (not fixed or complete
random migration), facilitates the maintenance of cooperation as a
form of evolutionary chasing between cooperators and defectors.
Role of Mutation in the Chasing Behaviors
We hypothesize that mutation plays a key role in the chasing
behaviors between cooperators and defectors. More specifically,
mutation would be critical for the spontaneous emergences of new
cooperative clusters after the existing cooperative clusters are
almost exploited by defectors.
To test the hypothesis, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics
in the absence of the strategy mutation (i.e., m= 0; the other
settings are the same as the original model). Simulation results
show that evolutionary chasing behavior is never observed in the
absence of mutation. Cooperators diverge to infinity (If the global
population reaches 100,000, it is defined as divergence) (Video S3)
Figure 2. (a) Typical snapshots of the downward evolution in Fig. 2(b). Blue represents cooperators and red represents defectors. If there are
less than 100 of each type, each color (blue or red) is reduced gradually. If there are two types of individuals in the same site, the colors are mixed.
The green lines indicate the movement of cooperators, and yellow lines indicate the movement of defectors. The numbers next to each group are
labels. The box located at the top-right space in each square indicates the generation, number of cooperators, and number of defectors. After
cooperative clusters emerge and move downward, they are chased and exploited by defectors. However, other cooperative clusters emerge, and
then these cycles are repeated. Video S1 shows a series of this evolution. (b) Dynamics of the number of individuals with entropy (explained later).
Blue signifies cooperators and red signifies defectors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g002
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or the global population goes extinct. From 100 independent
simulation runs, we observe 89 instances of the former case and 11
instances of the latter. This result shows the critical role of
mutation in the maintenance of the chasing behavior.
Moreover, we conduct another control experiment in the
absence of mutation. In this model, all of the N individuals are
initially set up at the same site (Fig. S6, S7 in File S1, Video S4, S5,
and S6), and the population consists of only one defector and the
other N{1 cooperators. As well as the previous control model,
the chasing behavior is never observed, and the simulation displays
two patterns of the evolutionary dynamics, the cooperator
divergence (Fig. S6, Video S4), and the defection invasion (Fig.
S7 in File S1, Video S5 and S6). In the case of invasion, a
cooperative cluster grows up at the center in early generations;
next, the cluster is gradually invaded by defectors from the inner
region. Interestingly in this case, unlike the original case (see
Fig. 2(a)), new clusters of cooperators never appear after the first
rise of cooperators. This finding further supports our hypothesis
that mutation plays a key role in the chasing behaviors between
cooperators and defectors, especially in the spontaneous emer-
gences of new cooperative clusters.
Discussion
Many organisms are mobile. They move around to find food or
to escape from harsh environments [44]. Moving around is also
important for collectively interacting with peers and/or for
forming a cooperative relationship with new individuals. In the
present study, we have investigated the coevolutionary dynamics
of cooperativeness and mobility (rate and direction of migration).
Computer simulations have demonstrated that natural selection
maintains cooperation as a form of oscillatory chasing between
cooperators and defectors and that mobility evolves to the
directional migration. Furthermore, we have found that the
population extinction rate in the coevolutionary dynamics is lower
when compared to the case without the evolution of mobility
(directionality of migration is preset to random or fixed). These
findings exhibit the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and
mobility through the oscillatory chasing between cooperators and
defectors with directionality.
Recently Suzuki and Kimura [42] have shown that the number
of cooperators and defectors is indicative of the oscillatory
dynamics in the coevolution of cooperation and mobility.
However, the underlying mechanism remains elusive. In this
study, we have demonstrated that chasing between cooperators
and defectors with directionality results in the oscillatory dynamics
and the coevolution of cooperation and mobility. In the oscillatory
dynamics, cooperative groups grow in certain local spaces and
collectively move in the same direction (i.e., directional migration).
Next, mutant defectors arise by chance in the groups, and then
exploit the cooperators. The cooperative groups therefore collapse,
but other cooperators emerge due to mutation in different spaces.
The cycle is then repeated. To our knowledge, this is the first study
to reveal the mechanism underlying the coevolution of coopera-
tion and mobility.
Although previous studies have focused mainly on the
mechanism by which cooperation is evolutionarily stable, there
has been concern expressed recently that cooperation can be
maintained as a dynamical attractor, such as the oscillation or
Figure 3. (a) Typical snapshots showing rightward evolution.
Note that in this case, the time axis is vertical. Also see Video S2. (b)
Dynamics of the number of individuals with entropy (explained later) in
the evolution to the right.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g003
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Figure 4. (a) Typical snapshots of the random migration. (b) The population dynamics of random migration shown in (a). The entropy is 2.0
according to the definition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g004
Figure 5. (a) Typical snapshots of the single fixed migration. The individuals’ movements are limited to the upward direction. (b) The
population dynamics of fixed migration shown in (a). The entropy is 0.0 according to the definition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g005
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chaos of the evolutionary system [45–47]. Here, we have shown
such a form of the evolution of cooperation in which cooperation
is maintained by escaping from the cashing of defectors in various
times and spaces.
The importance of directional migration is highlighted by
comparing the two extreme cases: fixed and random migration.
First, we have quantitatively shown that natural selection leads to
directional migration, and not fixed or random migration. Second,
under the directional migration favored by natural selection, the
population extinction rate is lower than that in the random and
fixed migration case. These results can be interpreted as follows. In
the case of fixed migration, it is impossible for cooperators to
flexibly move around and escape from defectors. On the other
hand, in the random migration case, cooperators cannot
collectively move in the same direction to form clusters.
Consequently, the evolution of cooperation is more likely to be
accomplished under directional migration. In summary, we have
discovered that mobility evolves to the directional migration with
the lowest rate of extinction, suggesting the importance of
appropriate flexibility in the direction of migration for the
evolution of cooperation.
We can consider other types of the interaction networks such as
triangle lattice, honeycomb, kagome, scale-free network, and
small-world network. It has been known in addition to the number
of neighbors, various aspects of the network structure (e.g.,
clustering coefficient) affect the evolution of cooperation. For
example, Perc et al. [48] have shown that on the square and
honeycomb lattices (clustering coefficient = 0), an intermediate
level of noise in the strategy adoption is optimal for the evolution
of cooperation, while the strategy adoption without noise is
optimal on kagome and triangle lattice (clustering coefficient.0).
One possible extension of this study is to examine the existence of
chasing behaviors, even in other interaction structures.
In the present study, we have not assumed individuals’ high
cognitive abilities, in contrast to the previous studies regarding the
effect of migration on the evolution of cooperation [23,25,32–
35,37,43]. For example, the timing of migration depends solely on
the inherent rate, but not on the environmental situations (e.g., the
neighbors’ cooperativeness, etc.) and each individual does not
necessarily know beforehand whether or not the destination of the
migration is favorable. In this sense, we believe that our model can
be applied to the emergence of cooperation in a wide range of
scales, including molecules, cells, organisms, ecosystems, and
human societies.
In this study we have shown the coevolution of cooperation and
directional migration, which reminds us of the historical story of
the humans who migrated out of Africa. It has been believed that
humans migrated from the African continent to the European and
Asian continents about 45–60 thousand years ago [49]. They
collectively moved and helped each other along the way. Our
study would provide insights into the evolutionary basis of the
great human migration. That is, natural selection encouraged
them to move correctively and cooperate with each other.
Models
Here, we describe the details of the model used, which is
extended from that used by Suzuki and Kimura [42]. The
environment is a two-dimensional M|M square lattice (each of
the four edges is connected to the opposite one). Each lattice-site can
be occupied by one or more individuals and can be vacant. At the
beginning of each generation, each individual plays an n-person
prisoner’s dilemma game [50–52] in each site. In this game, the cost
and benefit of cooperation are denoted as c and b, respectively,
where bwc, and the benefit is shared equally among the n{1 other
individuals at the site. Thus, the payoffs for a cooperator, p(CDk),
and that for a defector, p(DDk), where k is the number of others
cooperating in the site (0ƒkƒn{1), are given as
p(CDk)~
k
n{1
b{c, p(DDk)~
k
n{1
b: ð1Þ
Figure 6. Entropy from the 1000th to 2000th generations
(averaged over 1000 simulation runs, excluding the runs
resulting in extinction) as a function of the benefit-to-cost
ratio of cooperation in the three models.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g006
Figure 7. Frequency of extinction (over 1000 simulation runs)
as a function of the benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g007
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If there is only one individual in a site, the payoff is presumed to
be zero, following which each individual leaves an offspring at the
same site depending on the payoff received in that particular
generation. With this process, a higher payoff implies that there is
a higher probability that the individual will leave an offspring.
More specifically, let p be the payoff of an individual with a
probability of (pzc)=(bzc) that one offspring will be left. This
indicates that the probability linearly increases as the payoff
increases (note that in theory, p varies from {c to b in the
prisoner’s dilemma game). Moreover, the probability that each
individual dies is pd , irrespective of the payoff received. The
evolutionary process is controlled by the balance between the
probability of the reproduction and that of the death. In our
model, we assume that each individual’s reproduction depends on
his/her fitness (payoff of the game) while the death probability, pd ,
is constant. Note that each individual’s ‘‘total’’ reproduction
performance depends on the fitness, and is hence consistent with
the concept of natural selection. An extremely large death
probability can lead to population extinction. Conversely, if the
probability is extremely small, the population size diverges to
infinity. Both are unrealistic situations in the real world. We
therefore set the death probability at an intermediate value, i.e.,
0.4 (Table 1). See also the sensitivity analysis of the death
probability (Fig. S4 in File S1). In essence, each offspring inherits
the parent’s strategy, that is, the degree of cooperation (C or D),
migration rate, pm, and direction weights, d . Thus, these three
parameters are our main focal variables, which evolve under
natural selection (Table 1). In addition, mutation is introduced:
with a small probability m, a cooperator becomes a defector, and
vice versa. The migration rate, pm, and the randomly selected ith
element of the probability vector, di, change to p’m*N(pm,s2),
d ’i*N(di,s2). If p’mw1(v0), p’m is again set to be one (zero), and
d ’iw1(v0),d ’i is again set to be one (zero). After that, d is again
normalized to satisfy the property of the probability
P
di~1.
Finally, each individual moves to one of the four neighboring sites
(i.e., von Neumann neighborhood) with weighted probability
pm|di where pm is the migration rate for each individual and di is
the ith element of the probability vector d~fdU ,dD,dL,dRg,P
di~1. Each element of this vector indicates the weight of the
movement to an upper space (dU ), a down space (dD), a left space
(dL), and a right space (dR).
In the first generation, N~1000 individuals are randomly
distributed on the square lattice, and their strategies that indicate
the degrees of cooperation, migration rate, and direction weights
are randomly determined, while d is normalized to satisfyP
di~1. In this paper, we used the following parameter values
as the basic settings unless mentioned otherwise: lattice size
M~30, benefit-to-cost ratio of cooperation b=c~3:5, and
mutation parameters m~0:001 and s2~0:01. The parameter
description is shown in Table 1.
Supporting Information
File S1 Supplementary materials.
(PDF)
Video S1.
(WMV)
Video S2.
(WMV)
Video S3.
(WMV)
Video S4.
(WMV)
Video S5.
(WMV)
Video S6.
(WMV)
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: GI SS. Performed the
experiments: GI MS. Analyzed the data: GI. Contributed reagents/
materials/analysis tools: GI MS. Wrote the paper: GI SS.
Figure 8. Frequency of extinction (over 1000 simulation runs) as a function of the (a) initial density (N=(M|M)), (b) s, and (c) m. (a)
N~1000 is the initial number of individuals. The square lattice is composed of M|M , and only M takes values of 10, 30, 50, and 100. Thus,
N=(M|M) means the initial density. (b) s is the SD of the normal distribution in the mutation of pm and d. (c) m is the mutation rate. In all cases, the
directional migration is the lowest extinction rates. Other results as functions of these parameters have been described in Fig. S2, S3, and S4 in File S1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067702.g008
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